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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
Walker Bank & Trust Company, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent. 
v. 
Spencer C. Taylor, Bank Commissioner 
of the State of Utah, and State Bank 
of Provo, a Utah corporation, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
APPELL~TS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
No. 
9947 
This is a declaratory judgment action brought by 
'V alker Bank & Trust Company to have declared 
illegal the establishment by the State Bank of Provo 
of a branch bank on the Brigham Young University 
campus in Provo, Utah. 
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DISPOSITION JN LO,VER COURT 
The case was decided on the merits on facts stipu-
lated by all of the parties. The trial court granted 
judgment in favor of plaintiff on the ground that under 
the provisions of section 7-3-6, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, the existence of the defendant bank in Provo 
precludes the establishment by it of a branch bank in 
that city. The court granted injunctive relief to the 
plaintiff, but, on stipulation of the parties, suspended 
the injunction during the time within which this appeal 
is taken, and until the final determination of the appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendants seek reversal of the judgment, and 
a judgment in their favor. They also seek dissolution 
of the injunctive relief granted by the lower court. 
STATElVIENT 0~_, FACTS 
Walker Bank & Trust Company, a Utah banking 
corporation, having its head office in Salt Lake City 
and some thirteen branches in the State of Utah, in-
cluding a branch in Provo, Utah, seeks to have declared 
illegal a branch bank established on the Brigham Young 
University campus in Provo, Utah, by State Bank of 
Provo, a Utah banking corporation, having its only 
other and principal banking house in Provo, Utah. 
Provo City is not a city of the first class. At all 
times material there were located and operating in 
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Provo the defendant, State Bank of Provo, a branch of 
plaintiff, 'Valker Bank & Trust Company, and a branch 
of First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. On October 15, 
1962, defendant State Bank of Provo, as required by 
section 7-3-6, Utah Code Annotated 1953, filed an 
application with the defendant State Bank Commis-
sioner to establish a branch on or near the Brigham 
Young University campus in Provo, Utah. On October 
25, 1962, also in accordance with the provisions of sec-
tion 7-3-6, the application was approved by the defen-
dant Bank Commissioner and the Governor. The branch 
was opened for business on December 20, 1962. No 
protest to the application was filed by plaintiff, and no 
appeal to the State Board of Examiners, as required 
by section 7-1-26, Utah Code Annotated 1953, was 
taken by plaintiff. Instead, this action was filed in 
November 1962. Other pertinent facts as set forth in 
the Stipulation of Facts are referred to in the course 
of the argument. 
This case presents the basic question of whether 
the applicable Utah statute-section 7-3-6, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 -- prohibits the establishment of a 
branch by a bank in the same city in which its principal 
banking house is located, particularly where, as here, 
the only other banking facilities in the city are branches 
of banks having their head offices elsewhere. Also pre-
sented is the ancillary question as to whether plaintiff 
has the necessary standing to raise the basic question. 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
I. 
A. SECTION 7-3-6 UTAH CODE AN-
NOTATED 1953, DOES NOT PROHIBIT 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A BRANCH 
BANK IN A CITY OF THE SECOND 
CLASS 'iVHERE THERE IS ALREADY 
LOCATED ONE OR MORE BRANCH 
BANKS. 
The plaintiff's principal argument below was that 
the defendant bank could not establish a branch in 
Provo because plaintiff already had a branch there. It 
argued that a "branch" is a "bank" within the meaning 
of the first sentence of the fourth paragraph of section 
7-3-6. That sentence reads as follows: 
"Except in cities of the first class, or within 
unincorporated areas of a county in which a city 
·of the first class is located, no branch bank shall 
be established in any city or town in which is 
located a bank or banks~ state or national regu-
larly transacting a customary banking business, 
unless the bank seeking to establish such branch 
shall take over an existing bank." (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
· It is defendants' position that the legislature care-
fully distinguished between "banks" - meaning unit 
banks or the principal offices of banking institutions -
and ."branch banks"- meaning branch offices of bank-
ing institutions. The distinction has been clearly under-
stood by the Attorney General of the State of Utah 
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and has been followed by the Bank Commissioner of 
Utah and the Comptroller of the Currency in their 
administration of the law since it was enacted. 
The defendants urge this court to rule that since 
defendant was the only bank regularly transacting a 
banking business in Provo at the time its application 
was made and its permit granted, the existence of plain-
tiff's branch in Provo did not preclude the establish-
ment of defendant's branch there. 
The cardinal principle of statutory construction 
Is determination of the legislative intent. Rogers v. 
JVagstaff~ 120 Utah 136, 232 P.2d 766,768 (1951) and 
cases there cited. The intention of the Utah legislature 
in enacting the sentence above quoted can be discerned 
from well settled canons of construction which are 
imputed to have been within the knowledge of the legis-
lature, which is presumed to be conversant with the 
established rules of st~tutory construction. Chicago~ 
Burlington ~ Quincy Railroad Co. v. Cram~ 85 Neb. 
586, 123 N.W. 1045, aff'd 228 U.S. 70 (1912). 
The sentence above quoted was intended to express 
a prohibition; it provides '; ... no branch bank shall be 
established ... " in a particular place. I_f that particular 
place was where a branch bank was located, the term 
"branch bank" would have been used to describe that 
place. Instead, the legislature said "no branch bank 
shall be established in any city or town in which is 
located a bank ... " obviously intending to distinguish 
the latter term, "bank," from the term "branch bank" 
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it previously used. Had the legislature intended to in• 
clude within the prohibition a place where a branch 
bank was located, it would have inserted words to make 
that portion of the sentence read, " ... no branch bank 
shall be established in any city or town in which is 
located a bank or branch_, ... " The legislature could 
have inserted those words, but did not. 
In striving to ascertain the legislative intent, the 
court must look to the entire statute and its use of terms 
throughout. Christensen v. Slawter_, 173 Cal. App. 2d 
325, 343 P.2d 341 (1959). From a reading of the whole 
of section 7-3-6, it is clear that the term "bank" when 
used unconnected with the word "branch" means a unit 
bank. Thus in the first paragraph of the section the 
language "the business of every bank shall be conducted 
only at its banking house ... " must refer to a unit bank 
and not to a branch. In the second paragraph the 
language " ... any bank having a paid-in capital and 
surplus of not less than $60,000 may establish and 
operate one branch ... " must refer to a unit bank and 
not to a branch. In the third paragraph, where the intent 
was to include both unit banks and branches, the legis-
lature used the language, "All banking houses and 
branches ... " In the seventh paragraph, the term 
"branch" was used four times to distinguish a branch 
bank from a unit bank designated "bank." In the eighth 
paragraph, the legislature said, "No branch shall be 
established at a location outside the corporate limits 
of a city or town in such close proximity to an estab-
lished bank or branch as to unreasonably interfere with 
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the business thereof.'' If the legislature had not intended 
a distinction it would have needed only to use the word 
"bank." 
The conclusion is unavoidable that the legislature 
intended the word "bank" to mean unit bank. 
This interpretation was adopted by the Attorney 
General in advising the Bank Commissioner in the 
administration of the statute. In 1956, he was asked by 
the Bank Commissioner, "May more than one branch 
bank be established in a city of the third class, when no 
unit bank is there in existence?" In an opinion dated 
December 20, 1956, No. 56-142, the Attorney General 
ruled: 
"It is our opinion that the foregoing provision 
would not prevent the establishment of more 
than one branch bank in a city of the third class, 
if a unit bank is not there located. We base our 
result upon an interpretation of the word 'bank' 
or 'banks' as used in that section, concluding that 
such word is synonymous with a 'unit bank' and 
does not include a branch thereof. 
"In addition to the provision noted, Section 
7-3-6 in several instances, uses the term 'bank' 
to connote an institution, separate and distinct 
from, and not inclusive of, a 'branch.' For ex-
ample: 
''Vith the consent of the bank commissioner 
and the approval of the governor, any bank 
having a paid-in capital and surplus of not less 
than $60,000 may establish and operate one 
branch for the transaction of its business; pro-
vided, that for each additional branch estab-
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lished there shall be paid in an additional 
$60,000 (capital and surplus). 
* * * 
"A n.lJ bank desiring to establish one or more 
branches or offices shall file a written applica-
tion therefor in such form and containing such 
information as the bank commissioner may 
require. 
* * * 
"No branch shall be established at a location 
outside the corporate limits of a city or town 
in such close proximity to an established bank 
or branch as to unreasonably interfere with the 
business thereof.' (Emphasis added.) 
"In addition to the foregoing use of the word 
bank and branch in the disjunctive, the very 
definition of the term 'branch' sustains our con-
clusion. Section 7-3-6 defines branch as follows: 
'The term 'branch' as used in this act shall 
be held to include any branch bank, branch 
office, branch agency, additional office, or any 
branch place of business at which deposits are 
received or checks paid or money lent.' 
"Certain policy considerations are also persua-
sive. First, there is no limitation on the number 
of unit banks that may be established in a third 
class city as long as the establishment does not 
unreasonably interfere with an established busi-
ness, and the Banking Commissioner gives the 
necessary approval of the Articles of Incorpora-
tion pursuant to Section 7-1-26, U.C.A. 1953. 
Similarly, there is no legal limitation on the num-
ber of branches that might be established in the 
type municipality under consideration if an exist-
ing bank of five years' operation is acquired by 
another banking institution for the purpose of 
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establishing a branch. See Section 7-3-6, U.C .. A_. 
1953, as amended. It would therefore appear 
that the Legislature did not consider the pres-
ence of more than one branch in a city of the 
third class inherently against public interest, nor 
disadvantageous to the competing banking 
branch per se. 
"Second, if Section 7-3-6, U.C.A. 1953, as 
amended, is so construed that only one branch 
will be permitted in an incorporated area other 
than a city of the first class, even though no unit 
bank has been established, then it is conceivable 
that such municipality might reach a population 
growth, which one branch could not efficiently 
handle, and adequate service could only result 
when a unit bank was established or the city 
became one of the first class and additional 
branches were permitted. Such a construction 
would seem contrary to legislative intent. 
"Third, in our opinion the establishment of 
branch banks is justified on the theory that public 
advantage will be subserved if a banking institu-
tion creates additional offices or agencies for its 
existing customers, and thus provides more con-
venient and efficient service. When a unit bank 
has been established in a city of the third class, 
it presumably can service the needs of the muni-
cipal residents, and there would not be sufficient 
reason to permit a branch to compete with the 
established unit, the presence of the former inter-
fering with the latter. Hence the statutory pro-
hibition in Section 7-3-6. It is conceivable that 
two branches could under certain facts be justi-
fied in a third class city, sans a unit bank, on the 
theory that each was to service existing customers 
of the parent banks in other locations." 
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The interpretation urged by the defendants is not 
only consistent with the statutory language and the 
legislative scheme of bank regulation, but it is the inter-
pretation followed by the Bank Com1nissioner and the 
Comptroller of the Currency in their administration of 
the statute. 
Administrative interpretation of a statute does not 
aYail to overcome a statute so plain in its command as 
to leave nothing for construction, but consistent admin-
istrative practice continuing unchallenged for Inany 
years may not be overturned even if the scope of the 
statutory command is indefinite or doubtful. Norwegian 
Nitrogen Prod. Co. v. U.S.~ 228 U.S. 294, 313 (1932). 
Under the provision of Title 7 of the Utah Code, 
the Bank Commissioner is charged with the administra-
tion of the banking laws of the state. He is expressly 
vested with authority to administer the regulations as 
to branches in the granting of permits to establish 
them. Similarly, the Comptroller of the Currency is 
bound by the provisions of the Utah law in granting 
permits to national banks to establish branches in Utah. 
12 U.S.C. § 36(c) provides in part: 
"A national banking association may, with the 
approval of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
establish and operate new branches: (I) within 
the limits of the city, town or village in which 
said association is situated, if such establishment 
and operation are at the time expressly author-
ized to State banks by the laws of the State in 
question; and (2) at any point within the State 
in which said association is situated, if such estab-
10 
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lishment and operation are at the time authorized 
to State banks by the statute law of the State in 
question by language specifically granting such 
authority affirmatively and not merely by im-
plication or recognition, and subject to the re-
strictions as to location imposed by the law of the 
State of State banks." 
Both public officials have consistently followed the 
interpretation of 7-3-6 upon which defendant State 
Bank of Provo here relies. It is noted in paragraph 9 
and 10 of the stipulation: 
" ... On or about November 9, 1961, the Bank 
Commissioner authorized the establishment of 
a branch of the Beehive State Bank in the City 
of Tooele, not a city of the first class, at a time 
when a branch of First Security Bank of Utah, 
N.A., was regularly transacting a customary 
banking business in said city. 
"10. The Comptroller of the Currency granted 
an application of First Security Bank of Utah, 
N .A., in the year 1955, for the establishment of 
a branch by it in Murray City, not a city of the 
first class, at a time when a branch of Walker 
Bank & Trust Company was regularly trans-
acting a customary banking business in said City 
and said Comptroller of the Currency granted 
an application of First Security Bank of Utah, 
N.A., in the year 1957 for the establishment of 
a branch by it in South Ogden, not a city of the 
first class, at a time when a branch of Commercial 
Security Bank and a branch of Bank of Utah 
were regularly transacting a customary banking 
business in South Ogden. On January 21, 1963, 
the Comptroller of the Currency granted author-
ity to the First National Bank of Logan to 
11 
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establish a branch bank in Logan, not a city of 
the first class. At the time when said authority 
was granted, a branch of plaintiff lV alker Bank 
& Trust Company and a branch of First Security 
Bank of Utah, N.A., were regularly transacting 
a customary banking business in Logan." 
We have already adverted to the opinion of the 
Attorney General supporting the interpretation fol-
lowed by the Bank Commissioner and the Comptroller. 
This interpretation of the Attorney General adds weight 
to that of the administrative officers. In a similar situ-
ation, the 'Vyoming Supreme Court, in upholding the 
ad1ninistrative interpretation of a sales tax provision 
against that of a taxpayer, stated: 
"This construction of the law which has re-
ceived the approval of at least two of the chief 
law officers of the state has been followed by the 
board as the department of the state government 
charged with the duty of administering the Act. 
... Four sessions of the legislature of the state 
have occurred since the construction of the law 
above announced was transmitted to and fol-
lowed by the Board and no subsequent statute 
has been enacted which in anywise interferes with 
the views thus presented so far as we are in-
formed." Walgren Co. v. State Board of Equal-
ization~ 62 Wyo. 297, 166 P.2d 960, 963 {1946). 
A California court recently took the same view: 
"Consistent administrative construction of a 
statute over many years, particularly when it 
originated with those charged with putting the 
statutory machinery into effect, is entitled to 
great weight and will not be overturned unless 
12 
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clearly erroneous." DiGiorgio Fruit Corp. v. 
Dept. of Employment~ 56 Cal. 2d 62, 362 P.2d 
487, 491 (1961). 
In State Bank of l(enmore v. Bell~ 197 Misc. 97, 
96 N.Y. 2d 851 (1950), the defendant, Banking Board, 
approved the application of Marine Trust Co. to open 
and occupy a branch bank in the town of Tonawanda, 
New York. The plaintiff, which had its principal place 
of business in that town brought an action to review 
the determination made by the defendant. Plaintiff 
cited numerous items of error and illegality in defen-
dant's action, among them that defendant had misinter-
preted the law in that Tonawanda was unincorporated 
and the law did not permit branch banks to be estab-
lished in such villages. In dismissing the plaintiff's peti-
tion the court said that some fourteen branch banks had 
been authorized and opened in unincorporated villages 
in New York since the law was amended in 1934 to 
permit branch banking. The court held that if the law 
contained an ambiguity such practical construction of 
the statute by those charged with the duty of its appli-
cation and enforcement over such an extended period 
of time could not be ignored. 
Our statute here is not even ambiguous! 
Other cases holding that administrative interpreta-
tion of a statute should be upheld or that legislative 
acquiescence for such interpretation may be inferred 
from its silence over a period of years are: Oliver v. 
Spitz~ 76 Nev. 5, 348 P.2d 158 (1960); State v. Dept. 
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of Transportation of Washington, 33 'Vash. 2d 448, 
206 P.2d 456, 477 (1949); State ex rel York v. Board 
of Commissioners~ 28 Wash. 2d 891, 184 P.2d 577, 590 
(1947); G1dllot v. State Highway Comm. of Montana~ 
102 Mont. 157, 56 P.2d 1072, 1075 (1936); F.11.C. v. 
Bunte Brothers~ Inc.~ 312 U.S. 349, 351 (1940); U.S. 
v. American Trucking Assoc.~ 310 U.S. 534, 549 
(1939). 
Section 7-3-6 has been amended and re-enacted in 
1953, 1957 and 1963 without material change in the 
sentence under consideration. In light of its consistent 
and notorious administrative interpretation by both state 
and national supervisory agencies, it must be concluded 
that the legislature has, at the very least, acquiesced 
therein. 
The doctrine of re-enactment has long been recog-
nized by the courts. As early as 1908 the United States 
Supreme Court ruled that the re-enactment by Con-
gress without change of a statute which had previously 
received long continued executive construction was ~ 
adoption by Congress of such a construction. U.S. v. 
Cerecado Hermanos~ 209 U.S. 337 (1908). 
The doctrine has been generally applied in state 
as well as federal courts to all fields of administrative 
action, whether formalized by regulations or merely rec-
ognized in an administrative function and decision. Thus 
the Supreme Court of Michigan ~aid it was the well 
settled general rule that legislative re-enactment after 
such interpretation, "which must be presumed to have 
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been known to the legislature," carried with it the sanc-
tion of legislative approval of such conclusions, Chrysler 
Corp. t,. Smith> 297 Mich. 438, 298 N.W. 87, 135 A.L.R. 
900, 907 ( 1941). Similarly, the Texas Supreme Court 
said it was a very well established rule that where a 
statute of doubtful construction has been construed by 
executive officers of the state charged with its execution, 
and it has subsequently been re-enacted without sub-
stantial change of language, it will continue to receive 
the same construction. Stanford v. Butler~ 142 Texas 
692, 181 SW2d 269, 153 A.L.R. 1054, 1063 ( 194.,t). 
Even while declaring void an administrative rule based 
upon a statute which had subsequently been re-enacted, 
the California Supreme Court took great care to point 
out that the administrative construction of long standing 
could only be overturned after a finding that the statute 
involved was clear, unambiguous and required no am-
plification in its original writing. Whitcomb Hotel v. 
California Employment Commission~ 24 Cal.2d. 753, 
151 P.2d 233, 236 (1944). 
The defendants submit that the language in dis-
pute, having been interpreted consistently by the official 
charged with its administration over a period of years, 
and having been enacted and re-enacted unchanged by 
the legislature with knowledge of that interpretation, 
should be construed by this court in accordance with that 
administrative interpretation. 
The 1963 legislature had before it amendments to 
the banking laws, including 7-3-6, and re-enacted the 
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sentence under consideration without change. If there 
was any doubt as to the correctness of the interpretation 
of the Attorney General and the Bank Cmnmissioner, 
of the State of Utah, as well as that of the Comptroller, 
particularly in view of the pendency of this action, cor-
rective action could have been taken by the legislature. 
None was. Its action in re-enacting 7-3-6 without a1nend-
ing this sentence must be considered as a particular 
re-affirmation of the interpretation under which the 
administrative agencies have proceded. 
B. PLAINTIFF'S OFFICE IN PROVO 
IS A BRANCH AND PLAINTIFF'S METH-
OD OF ACQUISITION OF THAT BRANCH 
GIVES IT NO SPECIAL STANDING TO 
CONTEST DEFENDANT'S BRANCH. 
Plaintiff argued below: ( 1) That a bank is a bank 
no matter how many offices it has and, alternatively, 
(2) that plaintiff's Provo branch, because it was 
acquired by a rnerger, has somehow retained some char-
acteristics of a unit bank-at least sufficient character-
istics to prevent defendant from establishing its Brigham 
Young University branch. 
It is submitted that neither of these arguments is 
sound. 
Section 7-3-6 provides at the outset: 
''The business of every bank shall be con-
ducted only at its banking house and every bank 
shall receive deposits and pay checks only at its 
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banking house except a.Y hereinafter provided.n 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
The section then goes on to authorize the establishment 
of branches under certain circumstances and sets forth 
the procedure to be followed in obtaining authorization 
frmn the Bank Commissioner to do so. 
In 1911 the predecessor to this section was enacted. 
Chapter 25, Section 32, Laws of Utah, 1911, provides: 
"The business of every banking institution 
shall be conducted only at its banking house, and 
no bank in this State or any loan, trust or guar-
anty company or trust company conducting a 
banking business, or any officer, director or agent 
thereof, shall open, establish or maintain any 
branch bank or office, and shall receive deposits 
and pay checks only at its banking house." 
In 1933, the section was amended so that the first 
sentence of the statute enacted in 1911 read as it does 
today. That brief history makes it clear that from 1911 
to 1933 a bank could have only one office-at its bank-
ing house. Since the adoption in 1933 of the provision, 
"except as hereinafter provided" and the thereafter 
provision of section 7-3-6 authorizing the establishment 
of branches, a bank may establish other offices -
branches- if the statutory conditions are met and the 
statutory procedures are followed. 
One of the authorized statutory procedures to 
establish a branch is for a bank to acquire another bank 
by purchase or merger. That is the procedure followed 
by the plaintiff Walker Bank & Trust Company in 
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establishing its branch office in Provo. 'V alker Bank 
has only one banking house-Second South and Main 
Street in Salt Lake City, Utah. It has thirteen branches 
elsewhere. One of these is in Provo. But its branch 
there does not mean plaintiff is located in Provo. Michi-
gan National Bank v. Gidney_, 237 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 
(1956). 
'Ve do not contend that plaintiff's Provo branch 
is a different and separate entity in Provo. We do con-
tend that its office in Provo is a "branch" as defined 
in the statute. Section 7-3-6 states: 
"The term 'branch' as used in this act shall 
be held to include any branch bank, branch office, 
branch agency, additional office, or any branch 
place of business at which deposits are received 
or checks paid or money lent." 
Inasmuch as Walker Bank & Trust Company's office 
in Provo and that of First Security are "branches" as 
distinguished from "banks" as the terms are used and 
defined in section 7-3-6, their existence does not preclude 
defendant State Bank of Provo from establishing its 
branch in Provo. 
Plaintiff's alternative argument is that, somehow, 
because its Provo branch was acquired by merger with 
the Farmers' and Merchants' bank, the result is an 
hermaphrodite animal-a branch with a unit bank's 
special protections and requirements. It is submitted 
that Utah law recognizes no such species and that the 
merging parties cannot create one by contract. Nor did 
they. The stipulated record here shows: 
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(a) The merger agreement provides \V alker Bank 
& Trust Cmnpany is the surviving corporation (Para. 
:! of the merger agreement) ; 
(b) \Valker Bank & Trust Company's office in 
ProYo is designated as "Walker Bank & Trust Com-
pany, Farmers' and Merchants' Branch" (Para. 7 and 9 
of the 1nerger agreement); 
(c) The separate corporate existence of Farmers' 
and Merchants' Bank ceased with the effective date of 
the merger (Para. 10 of the merger agreement) ; 
(d) The merger agreement provides the principal 
office of the surviving corporation shall be located in 
Salt Lake County (Para. 19 of the merger agreement); 
(e) By letter dated October 24, 1955, the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System approved 
the establishment of a branch by Walker Bank & Trust 
Company at Nine North Third West Streets in Provo, 
Utah. 
Plaintiff also argued that section 7-6-7, U.C.A. 
1953 gives plaintiff Walker Bank & Trust Company 
"the right to protect its [Farmers and Merchants' 
Bank] status and competitive situation" inasmuch as 
"Such rights survive the statutory merger of Farmers' 
and Merchants' Bank with and into plaintiff." Plaintiff 
misconstrues the purpose of the section of the statute 
it cites. It is a part of chapter 6 of Title 7 dealing with 
mergers, consolidations, and conversions of banks. Con-
version is a change of a bank from a state to a national 
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charter or vice versa (section 7-6-1 (3} U.C.A. 1953}. 
In dealing both with the "resulting bank" from a 
n1erger and the "converting bank" from a conversion, 
the legislature provided that the surviving bank should 
have "all the rights, powers and duties" and the use of 
the name of its predecessor. See section 7-6-7, A, B 
and C and section 7-6-8, C and D. For both cases the 
statutory purpose is obvious. Banks hold a plethora of 
legal papers-negotiable instruments of every nature, 
mortgages, pledges, assignments, etc. The statutory 
provisions are to make clear that the surviving entity 
succeeds to all of these rights and powers without the 
necessity of execution of a multitude of documents of 
transfer or the recording of assignments of numerous 
mortgages; cf. 12 U.S.C. 214 (b) dealing with the 
statute of a national bank converted to a state bank. 
Plaintiff's contention also does violence to the clear 
purpose of the provisions of section 7-3-6 dealing with 
the establishment of branches and the protection of 
unit banks, not branch banking systems. It would 
indeed be subverting the legislative intent to find that 
a unit bank disappears upon merger into a branch bank 
system, but sufficient me1nory lingers on with the sur-
Yivor to make the branch a unit bank when it serves the 
system's purpose. 
Section 7-6-7 refers to "rights, powers and duties." 
Can the protective provisions of 7-3-6 for unit banks 
be a "right" or "power" which Walker Bank may waive 
when First Security established a branch in Murray, but 
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which it may exercise in Provo when defendant State 
Bank of Provo does likewise? Union Trust Co. v. Sim-
rnons~ 211 P.2d 190 would say not. 
Far from being irrelevant, the facts in Murray 
and Provo are parallel and pertinent. Walker's branch 
there was acquired by merger. The Comptroller of the 
Currency, required by federal statute, 12 U.S.C. § 36 
(c), to conform to state law in the granting of branches 
outside the home city, in 1955 granted a permit to First 
Security Bank of Utah, N.A., to establish a branch 
in l\Iurray at a ti1ne when plaintiff's branch office in 
~Iurray was regularly transacting customary banking 
business in said City. If plaintiff had a "right" to ex-
clude branches by virtue of the provision of section 7-6-7 
U.C.A. 1953, it had one in Murray in 1955. It did 
nothing. 
The statutory purpose is made clear by referring 
to another section in chapter 7, section 7-6-6. That sec-
tion provides that when the merger becomes effective, 
"The charters of the constituent banks, other 
than the resulting bank, shall thereupon be 
deemed surrendered.'' 
Thus no charter exists for the Farmers' and Merchants' 
Bank. The only charter existent is to the Walker Bank 
& Trust Company, with its principal office in Salt Lake 
County and with the right to operate a branch in Provo. 
That surviving entity has the "right" and "power" to 
engage in the banking business through its Provo 
branch office and such other branches as it may be per-
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mitted to establish or acquire, but it holds no charter 
to operate as a unit bank in Provo. That latter right 
expired with the surrender of the charter of Farmers' 
and Merchants' Bank. 
Finally plaintiff's contention that the Farmers' 
and Merchants' Bank has some sort of special identity 
proceeds on the false premise that plaintiff transacts 
business as a different and separate entity in Provo and 
over looks the difference between banks and branches. 
The \V alker Bank & Trust Company is one legal entity. 
It has thirteen offices, one of which is in Provo. Its prin-
cipal office is in Salt Lake City. It has but one Board 
of Directors. There is no Board of Directors assigned 
to the Farmers' and Merchants' Bank. Its loan limits 
as specified in section 7-3-39 of Utah Code Annotated 
are governed by its entire capital and surplus, not by 
any allocation of capital and surplus to each individual 
office. There are no stockholders in the Farmers' and · 
Merchants' branch. There are only stockholders of the 
"'\Valker Bank & Trust Company. There are no reserve 
requirements for the Farmers' and Merchants' branch. 
There are only reserve requirements for the "\V alker 
Bank & Trust Company. 
"'\Vhen plaintiff merged with the Farmers' and 
Merchants' Bank, it acquired a branch in Provo. It 
did not acquire any special right to preclude its local 
competitor from better serving its customers. 
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II. 
SECTION 7-3-6, UTAH CODE ANNOTAT-
ED 1953, DOES NOT PROHIBIT THE STATE 
BANK OF PROVO FROM ESTABLISHING A 
BRANCH BANK IN ITS O'VN COMMUNITY. 
Plaintiff's second argument is based, not on the fact 
that plaintiff has a branch in Provo and the prese·nce 
of that branch precludes defendant from establishing 
a branch in Provo, but on the fact that defendant itself 
is there. This anomaly is based on a literal reading of 
the following sentence from section 7-3-6 Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953: 
"Except in cities of the first class, or within 
unincorporated areas of a county in which a city 
of the first class is located, no branch bank shall 
be established in any city or town in which is 
located a bank or banks, state or national, regu-
larly transacting a customary banking business, 
unless the bank seeking to establish such branch 
shall take over an existing bank." 
Plaintiff's argument is that the defendant State Bank 
of Provo is regularly transacting a customary banking 
business in Provo. Since that is so, plaintiff contends, 
under the literal language of the statute, defendant 
cannot establish a branch in Provo because it is there 
itself. 
Plaintiff's attempt to ride defendant's coat tails in 
order to limit defendant's efforts better to serve its 
customers in the very community defendant was char-
tered by the state to serve, raises two basic questions. 
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( 1) Can the plaintiff assert defendant's presence in 
Provo as a basis for standing to sue when the statute 
on which it relies is obviously designed to protect local 
banks and not plaintiff? and ( 2) Is the absurd result 
of plaintiff's literal reading of one sentence of 7-3-6 
in accord with the legislative intent in the regulation 
of branch banking in Utah? It is defendant's position 
that both questions must be answered in the negative. 
A. The restriction expressed in section 7-3-6 as 
to the location of branch banks refers only to cities or 
towns other than one in which the principal banking 
house of the bank concerned is located. 
From 1911, (Ch. 25, § 32, Laws of Utah, 1911), 
until 1933, branch banking was expressly prohibited in 
Utah. In 1933, the legislature expressly authorized 
banks possessing the requisite capital and surplus to 
establish, with the consent of the bank commissioner and 
the governor, one or more branches (Ch. 6, Laws of 
Utah, 1933) . After making this general grant of author-
ity, the 1933 enactment contained this restrictive pro-
VISion: 
"No branch bank shall be established in any 
city, town or village in which is located a bank 
or banks, state or national regularly transacting 
a customary banking business, unless the bank 
seeking to establish such branch shall take over 
an existing bank or obtain the consent of all 
banks therein located, except that in cities of the 
first class, branches may be established without 
such consent." 
It is clear, from a review of the language of the 
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entire section as a whole and the statutory history and 
purpose of the regulation of branch banking, that this 
limitation was not intended to restrict branching activi-
ties of banks in the city in which their principal office is 
located. The legislature did intend to protect banks in 
the smaller cities and towns, other than Salt Lake City, 
from the undue competition of branches of larger banks 
whose principal banking house was located elsewhere. 
This court has held that the restriction was not 
intended to apply to Salt Lake City. Mr. Justice 'Vade 
in a concurring opinion in Union Trust Company v. 
Si,mmons, 116 Utah 422, 211 P.2d 190 (1949), after 
quoting the above sentence from the 1933 enactment, 
stated: 
"By the above emphasized provision [Mr. 
Justice Wade referred to the words "except that 
in cities of the first class, branches may be estab-
lished without such consent"] the legislature in-
tended to allow the establishment of a branch 
bank in cities of the first class not only as ex-
pressly therein provided, without obtaining the 
consent of all banks therein located, but also with-
out taking over an existing bank. Otherwise, that 
provision would not alter the meaning of that 
section at all, for under the provision which 
applies to cities, towns and villages other than 
cities of the first class, without the aid of such an 
exception a branch bank may be established with-
out the consent of the local banks by taking over 
an existing bank." 211 P.2d 190, 194. 
Chief Justice Pratt in the opinion of the court in the 
same case reached the same conclusion. He stated: 
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"The part of the statute first quoted above, 
establishes two methods of establishing a branch 
bank, compliance with either of which will make 
it possible for the bank commissioner to determine 
the issue of convenience and advantage in other 
than cities of the first class. (Emphasis supplied.) 
211 P.2d 190, 193. 
This court's interpretation that the restriction did not 
apply to branches established in Salt Lake City was 
ratified by the legislature in 1951 ( Ch. 10, Laws of 
Utah, 1951), when it amended the sentence to delete 
the consent provision found unconstitutional by this 
court in Union Trust Company v. Simmons~ supra~ and 
moved the "except" clause from the end to the begin-
ning of the sentence. There is nothing in the 1951 amend-
ment or the 1953 amendment ( Ch. 8, § 4, Laws of Utah, 
1953), which added unincorporated areas of Salt Lake 
County to the exception, to indicate that the legislature 
intended any greater restriction on cities and towns 
other than Salt Lake City than was originally pro-
vided in the 1933 enactment. 
The same principles of statutory interpretation and 
the same reasoning used by this court in arriving at the 
legislative intent in Union Trust Company v. Simmons~ 
supra~ make it equally clear that the "take-over" re-
striction on the general grant of authority to establish 
branch banks does not apply to a bank having its prin-
cipal banking house located in the same city, town or 
village where it proposes to establish a branch office in 
order to better serve the credit needs of the community 
for which it was originally chartered. 
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A page of history from the parallel development of 
national banking legislation establishes the genesis of 
the distinction between branches located in the same 
city, town or village in which the head office is located 
and branches located elsewhere. Following the financial 
panic of 1907 a nmnber of states, led by California, be-
gan to authorize branch banking. By 1927 branch bank-
ing was permitted, with minor modifications, in seven-
teen states. No authority was given to national banks to 
establish branches, but in 1922, the Comptroller of the 
Currency ruled that national banks could open addi-
tional "teller windows" in their home cities. These addi-
tional intracity offices in some instances became "great 
tall buildings, expensive. structures", 68 Cong. Rec. 
2179. This device was thwarted by the Supreme Court 
in First National Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri~ 263 
U.S. 640 (1923), which held that such offices were un-
lawful in states where branch banking was prohibited by 
state law. 
This ruling intensified a battle in Congress between 
advocates of branching and its opponents over legisla-
tion to authorize branches for national banks and state 
chartered banks which were members of the Federal 
Reserve System. Typical of the opponent's position 
was the statement by Representative Cannon: 
"The principle of branch banking when 
allowed to develop unhampered establishes a 
monopoly. It creates a gigantic banking octopus, 
with branches extending like tentacles from the 
larger cities out to the smaller towns, throttling 
local banks and sucking out of the country and 
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into the city the deposits and resources which 
should be available for local enterprises .... 
"There can be no comparison of the relative 
1nerits of the branch bank and the home-owned 
bank in their influence upon a community and its 
prosperity. The home bank, owned by local busi-
nessmen, has at heart the interest of the town 
and seeks to build up the community and con-
tribute to its prosperity. The branch bank is 
owned by outsiders, who have no pride in local 
affairs and who seek only profits and dividends. 
The hmne bank pays its taxes at home and con-
tributes to home institutions and enterprises and 
its stockholders spend their earnings at home. 
The branch bank pays the bulk of its taxes in 
other States and municipalities. It makes little 
or no contribution for local purposes, and its 
dividends are drawn from the town in which 
they are made and spent in distant cities. The 
home bank is controlled and managed by local 
boards of directors, the purest form of local self-
government, while the branch banks are con-
trolled by professional financiers, with little un-
derstanding and less sympathy for the needs and 
problems of their customers, and is, in short, a 
species of carpetbag government. The home bank 
means home control, independent and coopera-
tive. The branch bank typifies the overlordship 
of great money monopolies centered in alien 
territory, to which the patrons of every branch 
bank pay tribute as truly as the countrymen of 
the Nazarene paid tribute to Caesar in the golden 
age of the Roman Empire." 67 Cong. Rec. 3248. 
It is obvious, frmn his remarks, and that of others, 
of similar tenor, that what Congress was worried about 
was the invasion by large banking chains from outside 
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cities into the smaller communities. The resulting legis-
lation was a compromise known as the McFadden Act 
(Act of February 25, 1927, c. 191 §7, 44 Stat. 1228). 
This act authorized branches of national banks "within 
the limits of the city, town or village" in which the bank 
'vas located. The reasoning behind this measure was 
expressed by the Comptroller of the Currency, H. M. 
Dawes, in his testimony before the House Banking and 
Currency Committee reproduced at 65 Cong. Rec. 
11297. 
"At the outset it should be stated that while 
the question of extending outside facilities in the 
form of offices or branches beyond the limits 
of the parent institution but confined to muncipal 
limits is one that might be properly controversial, 
it does not, to my mind, involve the fundamental 
principle of branch banking. So long as such an 
operation is confined strictly to municipal limits, 
it remains in its essence a community operation 
conducted for the benefit of residents by 
residents. 
"I will not discuss the necessity or develop the 
arguments which have induced State legislatures 
to permit this form of operation. It seems to me 
it is sufficient to say that these intracity activities 
do not run parallel at all to the operations which 
are involved in the extension of banking influence 
by direct control in the form of branches covering 
a whole State or limits beyond the municipality. 
If the principle of local control over banking 
facilities within city limits is recognized and such 
an operation is forbidden in one and permitted 
in another State, it would not be a real concession 
to any branch banking principle, since intracity 
banking is, after all, community banking as dis-
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tinguished from State, district or national branch 
banking." 65 Cong. Rec. 11297. 
Mr. McFadden, the sponsor of the 1927 enactment, 
in support of the measure in the House stated: 
"Both sections enunciate the same policy and 
set up within the Federal reserve system the same 
standard of banking. They are based upon the 
assumption that state-wide branch banking is 
unsound and puts our whole banking system in 
danger. To those who believe as I do, state-wide 
branch banking will eventually lead to Inono-
polistic control over the credit facilities of an 
entire State and will, in the course of time, run 
out of business all of the rural unit banks, both 
state and national. "\Vhen a branch banking sys-
tem becomes fully developed in any given State 
the business and industrial activities outside of 
the large cities will be at the mercy of a few 
large city banks. This is what former Comptroller 
Dawes called 'absentee banking'." 67 Cong. Rec. 
2832. 
Then came the banking crisis of the early thirties which 
prompted the Banking Act of 1933 in the Congress 
and 1933 amendments to the Utah Banking Laws by 
the Utah legislature. Both looked to statewide branch-
ing as a means of ameliorating the distress in com-
munities where the only bank had failed or acquisition 
by a larger bank with substantial capital and resources 
was the only means of saving the smaller banks in 
financial difficulties. 1 
!Comptroller Dawes reported in 1930 that 88 per cent of bank 
failures were in banks having less than $100,000 capital and 80 
per cent were in towns having a population of 2,500 or less. 130 
Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 3981. 
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The Congress had two alternative suggestions be-
fore it in considering limitations on branch banking out-
side the home community. Senator Vandenburg pro-
posed to limit branches outside the home community 
of the bank with this proviso: 
"Except in a city, town, or village where there 
is no National or State bank regularly transact-
ing customary banking business, no such associ-
ation shall establish a branch except by taking 
over a unit bank existing at the time of the enact-
ment hereof or an affiliate of such association." 
76 Cong. Rec. 2026. 
The other alternative, proposed by Senator Bratton, 
was adopted by the Congress and limited branches out-
side the home community to: 
". . . the restrictions as to location imposed by 
the law of the state on state banks." Section 23 
of Banking Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. 36 (c). 
The 1933 Utah legislature did in one enactment 
what Congress had done, in 1927 and 1933, in two. It 
authorized statewide branch banking. In so doing it 
recognized the need to permit branching in the com-
munities which had never been able to support a unit 
bank or into a community where a unit bank had failed, 
leaving a void. But it also saw the need to protect unit 
banks from the undue competition of large banking 
chains. It sought to protect the state from additional 
unit bank failures in the smaller towns which might 
very well be caused by destructive competition from 
outside banking chain operations. It did so by pro-
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hibiting branching by outside banks if there were a bank 
already in the community, unless the existing bank or 
banks consented. It had no need to insert a special 
authorization for intracity branches, as Congress had 
done in 1927 because in the very same act the legislature 
authorized branch banking generally. Thus the thrust 
of the restriction adopted in 1933 was directed at the 
perils which Congressman Cannon outlined to the Con-
gress as far back as 1927-the invasion of the smaller 
communities by the large banking chains and absentee 
ownership. The legislature was not concerned with 
intracity branching as such and considered it amply 
covered by the blanket authorization of branch banking 
contained in the first paragraph of the 1933 enactment. 
The reason for this distinction between outside 
branches and intracity banking, recognized by both the 
Congress and the Utah legislature is obvious. Establish-
ing another office or branch in the same city, town or 
village where the principal banking house is located 
is merely an effort to meet more effectively the needs 
of existing customers. It is not an effort by the bank 
to expand its operation to a different area or to enter 
into competition with others. Bank regulators had 
found that one of the principal causes of failures of 
rural banks in particular was the existence of too many 
banks. Hearings before House Committee on Banks 
and Commerce, 71 Cong. 2d Sess., p. 141. 
Such problems are not applicable to branches or 
additional offices of a bank in its home town. Take for 
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example, the very situation in Provo. Obviously the 
Bank Commissioner in approving the defendant State 
Bank of Provo's application for a branch found a need 
for additional banking services on or near the Brigham 
Young University campus which has grown substan-
tially in recent years in the number of students, faculty 
and employees. One need only look at the branch of 
plaintiff 'Valker Bank & Trust Company, located near 
the University of Utah campus in the same city as its 
principal office, to recognize the need for banks better 
to serve its community where the demands of expanding 
population evidence such a need. Yet plaintiff would 
contend that the only banking facility that the legisla-
ture would permit Brigham Young University to have 
would be a new unit bank. One needs but a rudimentary 
acquaintance with banking economics to recognize that 
banking needs sufficient to support a branch might fall 
far short of supporting a unit bank. The legislature 
recognized this in its statutory scheme by allowing 
branch offices to be established. What plaintiff really 
contends is that since it cannot have a Brigham Young 
University branch, as it has a University of Utah 
branch, no one else should be permitted to have one. 
The situation in Davis County also illustrates the 
reason for the distinction between branches of outside 
banks and branches of banks located in the community. 
Davis County has enjoyed a phenomenal growth in the 
past decade. In each city and town in Davis County 
there exists an independent unit bank. Would the legis-
lature have intended that these existing banks could 
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not expand their facilities to meet the needs of their 
communities created by that growth? The interpretation 
of the statute followed by the Bank Commissioner, the 
Comptroller of the Currency and the Attorney General 
would allow such flexibility to meet the change in eco-
nomic conditions without the necessity of chartering 
new unit banks. It is only by reading with blinders just 
one sentence extracted from the entire banking code 
that one reaches the literal restriction upon which plain-
tiff here relies. One would seriously doubt that the legis-
lature would have intended its regulatory scheme to be 
so subverted, when by the very framework of the regu-
lation of branch banking, it was seeking to protect the 
integrity of existing unit banks. 
Let us turn to the language of the sentence on 
which plaintiff relies. Under the alternative methods 
provided by the 1933 wording of the restrictive lan-
guage, the defendant State Bank of Provo, as the only 
bank in Provo, could not take over itself, and to ask 
itself for permission would be equally absurd. Quite 
clearly, these methods have no application to the only 
bank in a locality. However, applied to a bank located 
outside of Provo, which sought to establish a branch 
in Provo, the statutory restriction has meaning and 
purpose-the protection of small local banks from the 
competitive advantages of a large chain, such as is 
plaintiff. Applied literally, as plaintiff would haYe it, 
to a bank located in Provo or any of the other smaller 
communities, the statute would have the anomalous 
result that no branches could be established in smaller 
34 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
communities, unless an established independent unit 
bank were taken over by a larger bank. That result is 
diametrically opposed to the whole scheme of the regu-
lation of branch banking - protection against the 
monopolistic tendency of large chain operations. 
This court has never been so wedded to the literal 
reading of a statute as to reach a construction as plain-
tiff here contends. As this court noted in Johanson v. 
Cudahy Packing Co ... 107 Utah 114, 152 P.2d 98 
( 1944): 
"By so holding we are cognizant of the fact 
that we are not following the literal wording of 
the statute, but such is not required when to do 
so would defeat legislative i~tent and make the 
statute absurd." p. 108. 
It is submitted that the literal wording of the statute 
on which plaintiff here relies would defeat the legislative 
intent and 1nake the statute absurd by holding that the 
only way a branch bank could be established in a city 
other than Salt Lake City would be for a larger out-
side bank to take over the existing independent unit 
bank, rather than allowing the existing independent 
unit bank, as here contended, itself to establish a branch 
better to serve the needs of the community for which it 
was first chartered by the State Banking Department. 
As Mr. Justice Wolfe in Norville v. State Tax Com-
mission~ 98 Utah 120, 97 P.2d 937 at 939 (1940), quoted 
with approval Sutherland on Statutory Construction, 
section 241 at 320: 
"In the exposition of a statute the intention of 
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the law-maker will prevail over the literal sense 
of the terms; and its reason and intention will 
prevail over the strict letter. When the words 
are not explicit the intention is to be collected 
from the context; from the occasion and necessity 
of the law; from the mischief felt, and the remedy 
in view; and the intention is to be taken or pre-
sumed according to what is consonant with reason 
and good discretion." 
The interpretation, which defendants here submit 
is consonant with the legislative intent and with reason 
and good discretion, does not require this court to add 
words to the statute or to overlook words in the statute, 
but merely to construe the restriction which the legis-
lature originally adopted in 1933 to apply only to 
branches established in a city, town or village other 
than in the city, town or village in which the bank seek-
ing to establish such a branch is located. In other words, 
whenever a sn1all independent unit bank in Provo, 
Logan, Clearfield, Brigham City, etc., can demonstrate 
to the Bank Commissioner that the _public convenience 
and advantage will be subserved and promoted by the 
establishment of an additional office to serve its custo-
mers in its own community, that is all that is required. 
If '"" alker Bank and Trust Company or some other 
larger bank desires to invade one of these smaller com-
munities to acquire for itself some of the business which 
an existing bank or banks enjoy in the regular trans-
action of their customary banking business in such 
community, such outside bank may not do so unless it 
takes over the existing bank. Thus the existing bank 
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is protected from the undue competition which the sub-
stantially greater resources of the invading bank could 
employ. At the same time, under this interpretation, 
the public in these smaller communities are guaranteed 
that their banking needs and conveniences will be sub-
served and promoted in that their existing banking 
facilities may be expanded by the addition of drive-ins 
and other offices in convenient locations as their own 
community expands. 
That the legislature intended to protect local bank-
ing from outside competition is further evidenced by 
the language which first appeared in the 1933 provision 
to the effect that no unit bank may be permitted to be 
acquired by another bank for the purpose of establish-
ing a branch unless such bank shall be in operation 
for a period of five years. The purpose of this is obvious 
-to prevent the large banks from establishing nomi-
nally independent unit banks in the towns where they 
cannot establish branches and then to acquire them and 
to make them branches by merger. 
Under the interpretation which the Bank Commis-
sioner has adopted in the granting of defendant its 
branch in Provo, and the Comptroller of the Currency 
has followed in granting a branch to the First National 
Bank in Logan, the regulation of branch banking by 
the legislature, since 1933 and through all the subse-
quent amendments of section 7-3-6, is consistent and 
evidences a definite legislative policy. 
1. Branches may be established if the applicant 
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possesses requisite capital and surplus and the bank 
commissioner finds that the public convenience and 
advantage will be subserved and promoted. 
2. There are no restrictions on branching in Salt 
Lake City, and, since 1953, unincorporated areas of 
Salt Lake County. 
3. There are no restrictions on banks establishing 
branches in their own communities. 
4. In cities and towns other than Salt Lake City, 
outside banks 1nay not invade such communities with 
branches unless an existing independent unit bank de-
sires to sell out. 
In considering the interpretation to be given to 
section 7-3-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, one further 
thought should be given to the construction claimed by 
plaintiff that intracity branches are prohibited, except 
in Salt Lake City. 
Within the requirements of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the Constitution of the United States and 
article I, section 25 of the Utah constitution, is there 
a Yalid reason for the legislature allowing "\V alker Bank 
to establish a branch near the University of Utah in 
Salt Lake City, but denying the only unit bank in 
Provo from similarly serving its customers at Brigham 
Young University or prohibiting the only unit bank in 
Logan from establishing a branch to serve Utah State 
University? Under the construction urged by plaintiff, 
the ability of a bank to establish another branch in its 
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own city-the community it was originally chartered 
to serve-depends solely on the size of the city in which 
it is located. 
The statistics as to bank failures in the small towns 
and the desire to restrain the tendency toward monopoly 
which was feared might result from unrestricted state-
wide branch banking might be a legitimate basis for 
excluding outside banks from branching in the smaller 
cities and towns where unit banks are established, but 
these factors hardly form a legitmate basis for preclud-
ing existing unit banks in those communities from im-
proving their services to their customers by opening 
another, more convenient office in the same community. 
It is an axiom of statutory interpretation that the 
court should construe a statute in such a way as to avoid 
doubts as to its constitutionality. The interpretation 
followed by the Bank Commissioner and urged here by 
the defendants is not only consistent with the legislative 
history and purpose of branch banking regulation, not 
only avoids an absurd result, but also clearly avoids 
·'that constitutional question. The interpretation urged 
by plaintiff meets none of these tests. 
B. Plaintiff does not have the standing to assert 
that defendanf s presence in Provo precludes defendant 
from establishing a bank there. 
The action of the Bank Commissioner, of which the 
plaintiff complains, is a public act done in the course 
of the Bank Commissioner's official duties. Unless 
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plaintiff can demonstrate that it has standing to bring 
a private lawsuit challenging that action, it should be 
denied relief forthwith on that basis. Plaintiff could 
acquire standing either under general principles of 
common law, or by a specific statutory grant. However, 
there is no express provision in the banking laws of the 
State of Utah, or elsewhere in the Utah Code, granting 
plaintiff the right to bring a private suit to attack the 
action of the Bank Commissioner. At the time this suit 
was filed, section 7-1-26 of the Utah Code required 
persons aggrieved by any decision or ruling of the Bank 
Commissioner to appeal such decision to the State Board 
of Examiners, whose decision was to be final. Plaintiff 
did not do so. The 1963 Legislature amended that law 
to eliminate review by the Board of Examiners and 
added the following language to Section 7-1-26: 
" ( 4) Any applicant for an approval of articles 
of incorporation, a permit to establish a branch, 
or a license to transact any business subject to 
the supervision of the Banking Department or 
any protestant to such application, feeling ag-
grieved by the act, decision or ruling of the Bank 
Commissioner with respect thereto, shall be en-
titled to judicial review thereof by filing, within 
thirty days after the decision or ruling of the 
Bank Commissioner is issued, any applicable 
form of action (including actions for declaratory 
judgment or writs of prohibitory or mandatory 
injunction) , in the District Court of the district 
in which the office of the Bank Commissioner is 
located. The reviewing court shall have power 
to hold unlawful and set aside any act, decision 
or ruling of the Bank Commissioner found to be 
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arbitrary, capriciOus, an abuse of discretion or 
otherwise not in accordance with law." Chapter 
7, Section 6, Laws of Utah, 1963. 
This provision is of no aid to plaintiff for two reasons: 
( 1) It was not in effect when the action was filed, and 
is prospective in effect only. (2) It grants judicial 
review only to a "protestant" to an "application." No 
protest to the application of defendant State Bank of 
Provo was filed by plaintiff. Thus, plaintiff can hardly 
qualify as a "protestant." 
Common law rules of standing are expressed in the 
Restatement_, Torts_, Section 710, as follows: 
"710. One who engages in a business or pro-
fession in violation of a legislative enactment 
which prohibits persons from engaging therein, 
either absolutely or without a prescribed permis-
sion, is subject to liability to another who is 
engaged in the business or profession in con-
formity with the enactment, if, but only if, 
" (a) One of the purposes of the enactment is 
to protect the other against unauthorized com-
petition, and 
"(b) The enactm,ent does not negative such 
liability." 
Plaintiff does not qualify under the principles set forth 
in section 710 of the Restatement because ( 1) section 
7-3-6 of the banking law does not have as one of its 
purposes the protection of the plaintiff, ( 2) the scheme 
of enforcement i1nplicit in the act must be held to nega-
tive plaintiff's standing, and ( 3) the principle of section 
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710 is not applicable where the defendant is operatin~ 
under a pennit duly granted by the proper regulatory 
authority. These points will be discussed in order: 
( 1) Section 7-3-6 was passed to permit branch 
banking, subject to certain restrictions. Those restric-
tions, as we have shown, were inserted to protect banks 
in small cities or towns from the harmful competition 
of outside large banking chains attempting to establish 
a branch in their city. The statute upon which plaintiff 
relies refers to a bank located in the city where the 
branch is to be established. Plaintiff is located in Salt 
Lake City and only has a branch in Provo. Michigan 
National Bank v. Gidney_, 237 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 
1956) . Plaintiff is one of the class which may establish 
a branch in Provo only by taking over an established 
bank. It is not one of the class protected by the statute. 
Not being within that class, it has no standing to ques-
tion the establishment by defendant, a bank located in 
Provo, of its branch in Provo. State ex rel Louisiana 
Trust & Savings Bank v. Board of Liquidation_, 136 La. 
571, 67 So. 370 (1915). As the court in Strong v. Camp-
bell_, 11 Barb. (N.Y.) 135 (1851) noted: 
''Wherever an action is brought for a breach 
of duty imposed by statute, the party bringing 
it must show that he had an interest in the per-
formance of the duty, and that the duty was im-
posed for his benefit. But where the duty was 
created or imposed for the benefit of another, 
and the advantage to be derived to the party 
prosecuting, by its performance, is merely inci-
dental and no part of the design of the statute, 
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no such right is created as forms the subject of 
an action." 
(2) The scheme of law enforcement in the banking 
laws negatives plaintiff's standing to enforce its alleged 
rights through a private action. 
In section 7-1-1 provision is made for a state bank-
ing department, headed by a Commissioner. Section 
7-1-26 gives the Commissioner discretionary power to 
grant applications for licenses for the transaction of 
any business subject to the provision of the banking 
department. "Licenses" include the permit to establish 
a branch office because: 
(a) There is no provision in Title 7 giving the 
Commissioner power to award "licenses" for anything 
in particular-with one exception: The Commissioner 
may grant a license to engage in the small loan business; 
and such a license is required by anyone wishing to enter 
the small loan business. But Chapter 10 of Title 7 speci-
fied the process for obtaining a license, including the 
procedure for a review of the Commissioner's decision. 
It is a different procedure entirely than that specified 
in 7-1-26. Therefore, the term "license" in 7-1-26 cannot 
refer to a license to engage in the small loan business. 
(b) It is necessary for a bank to apply to the Bank 
Commissioner for permission to establish a branch; 
without such permission, the bank may not legally 
establish such branch. 
(c) The word "license" must have some meaning 
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in the statute. A dictionary definition of license is "a 
formal permission from the authorities to carry on a 
business otherwise illegal." Therefore, it should here 
be construed to include as "formal permission" to carry 
on the branch banking business, otherwise illegal with-
out such permission. 
(d) If the term "license" is not construed to en-
compass the concept here advanced, the term is entirely 
meaningless, as there is no place in the banking laws 
where a "license" is expressly provided for-at least 
there is no such instance which can possibly be gov-
erned by section 7-1-26. 
Section 7-1-26 provides for a reasonable method 
of review for a decision of the Bank Commissioner. It 
specifies that "any person feeling aggrieved by the 
action, decision or ruling by the Bank Commissioner 
under this section may have the same reviewed by the 
State Board of Examiners whose decision shall be 
final.'' 1 
(e) As to the violations of law by banks, not acting 
pursuant to the Commissioner's permits or orders regu-
lating them, Section 7-1-23 makes it the duty of the 
Commissioner to report their actions to the county 
attorney of the county in which they are located, who 
shall institute proper proceedings for the enforcement 
of the law. The last paragraph of Section 7-3-6 speci-
1 The legislature apparently concurs in this analysis. Section 
7-1-26 was the section amended in 1963 to provide expressly 
for judicial review of branch permits or licenses at the behest of 
applicants or protestants, ch. 7, Sec. 6, 1963 Session laws. 
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fically makes violation of that section a misdemeanor, 
indicating that the legislature considered the police 
power of the state as being the agency through which 
this section would be enforced. 
The statutory scheme of enforcement may be sum-
marized as follows: 
The Commissioner has discretion to regulate the 
banking business in the granting of charters and licenses 
or permits. His decisions in this area can be reviewed 
by the State Board of Examiners, another administra-
tive body. Only when the Board acts outside its legis-
lative grant of authority can its decisions be challenged, 
otherwise its decision is final. But if banks violate the 
laws when not acting pursuant to the Commissioner's 
regulation, the Bank Commissioner has a duty to report 
them, and the county attorney may institute the proper 
proceedings. 
This scheme has adequate protections built into it 
to insure that no one's interest is infringed beyond the 
limit to which the legislature gave the Bank Commis-
sioner the power to regulate those interests. But there 
is no place in this scheme for private judicial action to 
enforce alleged "rights," except possibly a court review 
of the Board of Examiner's decision to determine 
whether the Board acted pursuant to law. 
Since this is a complete, self -contained system of 
enforcement, it negatives the existence of an additional 
private right of action- particularly where, as here, 
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defendant State Bank of Provo is acting pursuant to 
the authority granted by the Bank Commissioner pur-
suant to the statutory procedure. 
In Consolidated Freightways~ Inc. v. United 
Truck Lines~ Inc.~ 330 P.2d 522 (1958), the Supreme 
Court of Oregon held that the Motor Carrier Act, 
because it implied such a self-contained scheme of en-
forcement~ vested in the ICC the sole authority for 
enforce1nent, and plaintiff was held to have no standing 
to sue to seek private relief under the act. We contend 
that that situation is substantially parallel to this case, 
and that the result should be the same. 
(3) The principle of Restatement~ Torts § 710 is 
not applicable when defendant is operating under a 
permit from the proper regulating authority. 
The situation in which the principle of Section 710 
applies is a situation where the defendant has acted 
without securing the statutorily prescribed permit from 
regulatory authority. That situation is significantly 
different from the situation in the case at bar where 
defendant State Bank of Provo has only done that which 
the state regulatory authority has given it permission 
to do. There is no basis for allowing a third party to 
maintain a private action on the theory the Bank Com-
missioner has acted contrary to law in granting such 
permit. The statutory scheme is clear that the legis-
lature intended the legal offices of the state and review 
by participants in the administrative procedure them-
selves to control the action of its administrative agencies. 
46 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Otherwise, the courts will be cluttered with litigation by 
third parties who took no part in the administrative 
proceedings, but who later seek to claim some "right" 
has been invaded by administrative action in which they 
voiced no interest. Similar procedure is set forth in 
section 54-7-16 U tab Code Annotated 1953, in dealing 
with orders of the Public Utilities Commission where 
only "applicants" or a "party to the proceeding" may 
seek judicial review. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, as we have shown in discussing the 
inte~pretation of section 7-3-6, the pertinent provisions 
of that statute are designed to protect unit banks in 
cities outside Salt Lake City from invasion by larger 
city banks with branch systems, i.e. the defendant State 
Bank of Provo from the vast economic resources and 
competitive strength of institutions with branch systems 
such as plaintiff Walker Bank & Trust Company. This 
case, strangely enough, presents the converse situation. 
The second largest bank in the State of Utah with thir-
teen branches and resources in excess of $240,000,000 
and a member -·of a multi-state chain having nearly 
$6,000,000,000 in deposits and some 447 banking houses 
located throughout the eleven Western states seeks here 
to turn the legislative shield designed to protect the 
smaller banks into a sword to cut off any attempt by a 
small unit bank to better meet its customers' banking 
needs in its own community. Instead of restricting the 
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monopolistic tendencies of large chain systems, plain-
tiff would have this court interpret the statute so as to 
strangle the competitive efforts of a small independent 
bank. 
It is submitted that such an interpretation of the 
statute would do violence to the legislative language 
as well as to the legislative purpose in enacting its 
regulatory scheme of branch banking. The Supreme 
Court in Union Trust Co. v. Simmons_, supra_, struck 
down one dog in the Inanger. Plaintiff would here ask 
this court to sanction another. 
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